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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ENID B. COSGRIFF, HAROLD M.
ISBELL, RAINER M. DAHL, and THE
CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, as Trustee for LYN C.
ISBELL and PATRICIA C. DAHL,
Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 15943

GEORGE M. SCHNEITER, JoANN D.
SCHNEITER, individually as custodian for STEPHEN D. SCHNEITER,
DANIEL D. SCHNEITER, GEORGE D.
SCHNEITER, ELIZABETH A. SCHNEITER
and MICHAEL D. SCHNEITER,
Appellants.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment of the
number of shares held by the shareholders of Lake Hills
Golf Club, Inc.

(Lake Hills), in which the defendants

(Appellants) , by counterclaim, seek reformation of the
stock record books.

At stake is control of the

corporation.

JUDGMENT BELOW
The district
presiding)

co~rt

(Judge G. Hal Taylor,

upon a two day non-jury trial entered findings

of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with
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Respondents' prayer and dismissed defendants'
counterclaim.

The court below heard the testimony of nine

witnesses and received and considered approximately 40
exhibits.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents urge the Court to affirm the judgment
below in all respects.
STATEMENT OF FACTsl/
The issue presented by this case is how many
shares of Lake Hills,
{Appellants).

are owned by the Schneiter family

The issue arises because while it is

conceded that the Respondents as a group own 250-l/2l/
shares, it was contended, beginning in 1975, by
Appellants, that they owned 250-1/2 shares as well (see,

ll

Respondents must restate the facts because
Appel!ants' statement is not a fair reflection of the
trial record.
Appellants assert, for instance, that
G. M. Schneiter (Schneiter Jr.) did not know the
source of his original one share (App. 's Br. 3).
But
this is rebutted by the evidence that he was Secretary
from 1957 (R. 142) until January, 1965 when his wife
became Secretary in which position she continued until
this controversy arose (Ex. 2).
The Schneiters always
controlled the stock record book.
(R. 142, 145, 175;
See also Ex. 13) . Appellants assertion of
representations of equal ownership rests upon the
unsupported testimony of Schneiter Jr. and is indeed
refuted, as shown infra.

ll

Schneiter Jr. on cross examination conceded as
follows:
"Q. Do you acknowledge that the Cosgriffs
own 250-l/2 shares? A. Yes."
(R. 143).
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e.g., R. 110), "a legal impossibility" as Appellants only
now concede (App. 's Br. 12).

It is "a legal

impossibility" because the Articles of Incorporation
authorize only 500 shares (Ex. 2)

and Appellants'

contention would result in a total issue of 501 shares, or
an over issue of one share.
As developed infra, this suit was begun by
Respondents for declaratory judgment, when they learned of
Appellants claim, to determine the number of shares owned
by Appellants.

(R. 136).

Appellants claim to own 250-1/2

shares ultimately comes down to their contention that 83
84 (R. 148-150, 151)

and their subsequent attempts so to

obscure the record as to make the impossible appear
plausible.l/

Respondents suit for declaratory judgment

thus sought a determination that Appellants owned, as a
group only 249-1/2.

The trial judge found in accordance

with Respondents' prayer.
No one contests that in 1956 Walter Cosgriff,
George Schneiter, Sr. and Ven Savage joined together to
form Lake Hills.

It is equally uncontested that the first

three issues of stock were:

ll

Appellants in their brief, at 4, now assert that they own
only 249-1/2 shares. But the evidence is clear that
Schneiter Jr. claims 250-1/2 shares (R. 143) and there are
certificates currently standing in the Schneiter family
name in the amount of 250-1/2. (Ex. 3 and 4; R. 143).
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Cosgriff

Schneiter

17
17
50

Total

TI

Savage

16
17
50

Total

TI

17
16
50

TI

Total

There is no evidence, and indeed no contention,
that any mistake was made in these first three issues,
despite the fact that thereby Cosgriff owned one more
share than the other two, and despite the fact that
Cosgriff characterized these ratios as "one-third."!/
This is but one instance of Cosgriff's careless use of
such imprecise characterizations.
It is only the fact that Savage agreed to sell
out to the other two that gives rise to a controversy.
What is now clear, from Exhibit 13, is that Schneiter,
Sr., the keeper of the stock record book,

(R. 142, 175)

knew exactly how many shares Savage had to sell and
reported to Cosgriff that he was dividing these 83 shares
41-1/2 to Cosgriff, 40-l/2 to himself and 1 to his son.
No issue would be before the Court had the
Schneiters' faithfully carried out this expressed intent.
Instead they caused a certificate (Cert. i 11; Ex. 8)

to

be issued to Schneiter Sr. which read both "41-l/2" and
"Forty and one-half" and they caused the stub in the stock

!/

(Ex. 16).
Indeed Cosgriff owned 33.6% and the other
two owned 33.2% each, just a hairs'-breadth away from
33.33%.
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record book (Ex.

3, stub ll)

to read "4~-l/2,"~/.

There

was also issued in 1957 one share to Schneiter Jr., which
is clearly a transfer share from Savage's stock (Ex. 3,
stub 12).

The conflicting numbers on Certificate #ll and

the stock record book (Ex. 3)
that 83
shares.

later gave rise to the claim

84, and thus to Appellants' claim to own 250-l/2
It is equally clear from Exhibits 16 and 18 that

Cosgriff paid exactly one-half and Schneiter exactly
one-half of the total price for Savage's shares.
Following this buy-out, the corporation issued an
additional 125 shares to each of Cosgriff and Schneiter,
Sr.

There is no claim that any mistake was made in this

issue and there certainly is no evidence of mistake.

So

matters rested for 18 years during which time both
Schneiter Sr. and Cosgriff died and their shares were
distributed to their heirs.
In the years that followed,

the Cosgriff family

continued to furnish financial assistance to the
corporation and the Schneiters continued in the day to day
management.

(R. 117).

After both Walter Cosgriff and

George Schneiter, Sr. died, Mrs. Cosgriff represented the

~/

The figure 4~-l/2 is correct; the zero had a line
drawn through it. (R. 113, 127, 135-136; Ex 5).
Schneiter, Jr.'s testimony, if it can be believed, was
that he found the stock to so read after his father's
death.
But he also conceded the record book was
exclusively in the Schneiters' control.
(R. 142, 145).
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Cosgriff interests on the Board of Directors (R. 109) and
George Schneiter, Jr. took over the daily management
responsibilities.

Mrs. Cosgriff always understood that

she and her family had control (R. 109) and the Cosgriffs
had the final word on such things as Schneiter Jr.'s
salary (R. 117, 201), despite the fact that Mrs. Cosgriff
might have been technically out voted on the Board by
Schneiter, Jr. and his wife.

(R. 109, 201).

It was only in the Spring of 1975 that the
Cosgriff family learned that Schneiter, Jr. contended that
he and his family owned 250-1/2 shares of the corporation,
a contention that, of course, requires the creation of an
additional share out of thin air.

Years earlier

Mrs. Cosgriff had installed her brother, Robert Barr, on
the Board and had transferred one of her shares to him so
he would qualify as a shareholder-director.

(R. 111).

In

1975 Mrs. Cosgriff determined to turn over the directorial
oversight to her sons-in-law, Harold Isbell and Rainer
Dahl.

(R. 130).

She, therefore,

in a meeting with

Schneiter, Jr., Isbell and Barr asked Schneiter, Jr. to
transfer the one share standing in Barr's name back to
her.

In response Schneiter, Jr. turned to Barr, offered

to buy the share, and asked Barr to name his price.

Barr,

of course, refused saying the share represented control.
Schneiter, Jr. thereupon insisted it did not.
121-122, 131).

(R.

A few weeks later Schneiter, Jr.

111,

in a
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conversation with Isbell insisted he owned 250-1/2 shares
(R. 133) and indeed the Schneiters had certificates which
on their face added up to 250-1/2.

(R. 143).

These exchanges precipitated an examination (R.
112), for the first time, of the stock record book by the
Cosgriff family and hence their discovery of the
conflicting numbers in the stock records (R. 127, 131).
The exchanges also prompted the Schneiters' attempt to
improve their position by (a) obliterating the critical
figure in the stock record book~/ and (b) unilaterally
increasing the capital stock account by $100 to
$50,100,2/ an increase which would reflect the issuance

of 501 shares of stock.
In contradiction to this overwhelming evidence
Appellants rely upon (a) some correspondence and
conversation in which Mr. Cosgriff loosely and imprecisely
characterized his relationship with Savage and Schneiter,
(b) a letter of Schneiter, Sr.'s (Ex. 13), and (c) the
testimony of Schneiter, Jr., all of which has been related
in Appellants' Brief.

~/

Schneiter admitted blotting the figure after the
Cosgriffs examined the stock record book.
(R. 151-152).

21 Exhibits

11 and 12, being balance sheets of the
corporation for August and September 1975. This
change was made at Schneiter, Jr.'s instance. (R.
159-161).
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ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS' BURDEN WAS TO SHOW MUTUAL MISTAKE
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

This case is a graphic illustration of the wisdom
of a very basic and profound standard of this Court; that
is, that mutual mistake sufficient to warrant reformation
must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Evidence necessary to substantiate the
mutual mistake of fact must be clear,
definite and convincing, and the party
seeking reformation should not be guilty of
negligence in the execution of the contract .
• . or laches in making timely application
for the reformation.
This principle has
consistently been applied in equity
throughout its reformation of instrument
cases.
Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d
620, 623 (1957).
See also Peterson v. Eldredge, 122 Utah 96, 246 P.2d 886
(1952).
This rule is especially salutory in a case where
one party seeks to reform an agreement made over 20 years
ago when the only people who could testify as to intent
are both long dead, and where the written record
scanty.

is~itself

It should also be pointed out that the

Schneiters' own conduct created whatever confusion now
exists, and that they were content to rest on that
confusion for nearly 20 years.
To have awarded reformation the district court
would have had to ignore this rule of law.

Indeed the

court below would have had to rely on evidence which,
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taken as a whole, would not warrant reformation under any
standard of proof.
II.

APPELLANTS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED MUTUAL
MISTAKE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

Appellants' nowhere in their brief cite a single
line of evidence that Walter Cosgriff intended to acquire
less than one-half of Savage's stock.

Equally, there is

no evidence that Walter Cosgriff ever intended to permit
Schneiter, Jr.

to buy a single share of treasury stock.

(See footnote 4 on p.

9 of their brief where Appellants

make this suggestion}.
Respondents suggest a review of the exhibits
(including those not received, but now relied upon by
Appellants}

in chronological order for the period before

and up to the date of the Savage buy-out.

They are

Exhibits 14, 15, 16, l3 and 19.
Exhibi~

14 is Cosgriff's and Schneiter's joint

letter to Savage proposing to Savage that he either
acquire Cosgriff's and Schneiter's stock or sell his
stock.

In that letter Cosgriff and Schneiter proposed to

Savage that "you then agree to sell us your stock . .
. costing $100.00 a share or a total price of approximately
$8,333.33 at a $15,000.00 profit, or a purchase price of
$23,333.33".
Also, on that same date, Cosgriff prepared
Exhibit 15 addressed to Savage advising him that the
corporation needed $25,000 additional capital and that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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three shareholders should have a right to purchase "our
pro rata share" and that "each of us would have to put up
$8,333.33".

The letter further provided for Savage to

assign his interest to Cosgriff if Savage was not willing
to advance the additional funds required.

Schneiter on

Exhibit 15 accepted this assignment.
A few days later, by Exhibit 16, Cosgriff wrote
Schneiter to advise Schneiter that he had paid Savage
$23,300 "covering the purchase apparently of 83 shares
. representing his approximate one-third interest."
Cosgriff went on to write "you would want and would expect
to put up half of this money so that we would each own a
50% interest."
The most

fav~rable

inference for Appellants'

from

this correspondence is that (a) Cosgriff and Schneiter
believed when Exhibits 14 and 15 were written that Savage
owned approximately 83-1/3 shares,

(b)

a few days later

when Cosgriff wrote Exhibit 16 he had learned that Savage
owned 83 shares which represented an approximate one-third
interest and (c) Cosgriff offered Schneiter the
opportunity to acquire half of Savage's stock apparently
thinking this would result in an equal division of the
stock.
Unfortunately for Appellants the more plausible
inference that could be drawn from the evidence was that
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Cosgriff never cared about exact equivalents, but was only
thinking in approximations.

This latter inference is

supported by the way in which the first three issues of
stock were handled.

Thus, in the first issue Schneiter

got 16 shares while the other two got 17 each.

In the

second issue Savage got 16 and the other two 17 each.
Thus, Cosgriff owned one more share than the other two.
In the third issue of stock, no attempt was made to
rectify the inequality, the parties obviously not being
concerned about such an exactitude as is only now asserted
by Appellants.

Nearly a month later, on October 10, 1957,
Schneiter wrote to Cosgriff, Exhibit 13.

In that letter,

the person who kept the stock record book wrote that
Savage's shares were being divided 41-1/2 to Cosgriff, and
41-1/2 to Schneiter, Sr. out of which Schneiter, Sr. was
assigning one share to Schneiter, Jr., "thinking that you
[Cosgriff] would probably prefer to maintain fifty percent
interest."

Exhibit 19 demonstrates that Schneiter paid

exactly one half of the purchase price for Savage's stock.
Thus, the only intent clearly expressed by both
parties to the transaction was that Savage's 83 shares be
paid for and divided equally.
good friends

There is no hint that these

(R. 163) were concerned about maintaining

equality of shareholdings with exactitude.

(Indeed
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Schneiter, Sr. by his acceptance of the terms of Exhibit
15 was prepared to see Cosgriff acquire a very substantial
majority position.)

The use of such terms as "one third,"

and "50%" were merely used as approximations.

These

documents do not amount to clear, definite and convincing
evidence that the result sought was exact equality of
ownership.

The other evidence cited by Appellants does

not add anything to their contention.

Walter Cosgriff's

offhand statements of equal ownership are again merely
approximations.

Very few of us would differentiate

between 50.0% and 50.1% when describing, in casual
conversation, a business relationship with a good friend.
Indeed some of this evidence cited by Appellants is quite
incredible and could not have been believed by the trier
of facts.!!./
In summary the evidence before the trial court is
susceptible of two inferences:

first, that Cosgriff was

speaking loosely and did not intend anything more than an
approximation of one-third or one-half; and second, that
Cosgriff was in error in assuming that the equal division
of Savage's stock would result in exact equality between
him and the Schneiters.

!!_!

However, either inference could

For instance Schneiter, Jr. testified that Walter
Cosgriff in the same conversation in which he
mentioned equality also promised to give up his
valuable investment free of charge to the Schneiters.
(R.

167,

169,

197).
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be drawn by the trier of facts.

There is no compelling

reason to draw the inference urged by Appellants.

Because

of this, Appellants have failed to establish their
counterclaim by clear and convincing evidence.

The

judgment below should be affirmed because the evidence
does not clearly preponderate against the finding of the
trial judge.

Provo City v. Lambert,

574 P.2d 727, 730

(Utah, 1978).
III.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH MUTUAL MISTAKE
AS WOULD WARRANT REFORMATION.

Let us assume arguendo that the only permissible
inference from the evidence is that Cosgriff believed an
equal division of Savage's stock would result in exact
equality between himself and the Schneiters.

Even in this

instance Appellants would not be entitled to reformation.
Reformation is typically appropriate where the
parties agreed orally to a term, but the written contract
either omits the term or contains a contradictory term.
That is to say, there must be a pre-existing agreement not
reflected in the writing.
Professor Corbin in his treatise on contracts
states the general requirement for reformation, the
existence of a pre-existing agreement, as follows:
Whatever may be the form of the transaction
... and whatever may be the explanatory
theory as to when and how the contract
became binding, a court will not decree
reformation unless it has convincing
evidence that the parties expressed
agreement and an intention to be bound in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accordance with the terms that the court is
asked to establish and enforce.
3 Corbin on Contracts, § 614 at 725 (1960).
In State v. Ashton,
727,

730

4 Ariz. App.

599, 422 P.2d

(1967), this same rule is stated as follows:
To entitle one to reformation, it is
essential to show that a definite intention
on which the minds of the parties had met
pre-existed the written instrument and that
the mistake occurred in its execution.
Greenfield v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
75 Ohio App. 122, 61 N .E. 2d 226 ( 1944) . I f
the minds of the parties had not met in a
prior agreement, there is nothing to be
corrected.
76 C.J.S. Reformation of
Instruments 18.
The Utah rule is no different.
The right to reform is given, at least in
part, so as to make the written instrument
express the bargain the parties previously
orally agreed upon.
When a writing is
reformed the result is that an oral
agreement is by court decre2 made legally
effective although at variance with the
writings which the parties had agreed upon
as a memorial of their bargain.
Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180, 182 (Utah 1975).

See also Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d 620,
623

(1957).
In the case at bar the precondition to

reformation has not been shown.
any prior agreement.

There is no evidence of

The only evidence of the intent of

either party to the transaction is that the Schneiters
were to get 41-1/2 shares of Savage's 83 shares.
13).

T!'lere is, therefore,

(Ex.

no basis at all for reformation.

That the result of this transaction was not to
effect an exactly equal division of shares does not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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advance Appellants' position, even if it could be found
that the parties intended that result.
Cooper, 525 P.2d 41 (Utah 1974).

Percival v.

In Percival the parties

each believed they were dealing with a half-acre parcel.
The deed given, however, described the lot as a rectangle
measuring 114.5 feet by 165 feet, or slightly less than a
half-acre.

Apparently in Percival, as here, simple

mathematics were not applied.

This Court, in Percival,

refused to reform the deed even though there was clear and
convincing evidence the parties believed they were
conveying a half-acre.

Similarly here there should be no

reformation.
Appellants' argument is, in essence, that the
agreement reached by Schneiter and Cosgriff was based on a
mistaken belief of the pre-exist1ng facts, the number of
shares owned by each.

In effect Appellants urge that a

different agreement might have been reached had the
parties been more accurately informed.

But the court

cannot now reform the documentation of their agreement,
even if the agreement was entered into based upon a
mistake of fact, since the mistake occurred prior to their
agreement.

Professor Corbin in his treatise on contracts

elaborates on the requirement that the mistake justifying
reformation must occur after the agreement is reached.
If two parties are caused to enter into a
contract by reason of their common ignorance
or common mistake as to some fact, but for
which they would have not agreed, this may
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be ground for rescission, but it is not
ground for reformation.
Proof of such a
mistake as this does not show that the
parties have ever expressed assent, orally
or otherwise, to any contract other than the
one written.
That writing truly expresses
the only terms on which they have agreed.
It may be subject to rescission for mistake;
but there is no other agreement in
accordance with which it can be "reformed."
3 Corbin on Contracts, § 614 at 728 (1960).
Willison states a similar rule:
Still more clearly, if, because of mistake
as to an antecedent or existing situation,
the parties make a written instrument which
they might not have made, except for the
mistake, the court cannot reform the writing
into one which it thinks they would have
made, but in fact never agreed to make.
13 Williston on Contracts, § 1549 at 134
(1970).
See also Russell v. Shell Petroleum Corporation,
66 F.2d 864, 867 (lOth Cir. 1933), where the Court said:
To justify reformation on the ground of
mistake, the mistake must have been made in
the drawing of the instrument and not in the
making of the contract which it evidences.
Robinson v. Korns, 250 Mo. 665, 157 S.W.
790; Curtis v. Albee, 167, N.Y. 360, 60 N.E.
660. A mistake as to the existing
situation, which leads either one or both of
the parties to enter into a contract which
they would not have entered into had they
been apprised of the actual facts, will not
justify reformation.
It is not what the
parties would have intended if they had
known better, but what did they intend at
the time, informed as they were.
Mutual mistake justifying reformation "may be
defined as error in reducing the concurring intentions of
the parties to writing" Naisbitt v. Hodges, supra at 623.
It is not sufficient to prove only a misapprehension of
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the facts.

Giving Appellants the benefit of all

inferences, all that the trier of facts in the instant
case could possibly infer from the evidence is that the
parties intended the Schneiters to receive 41-1/2 shares
of Savage's stock, and Cosgriff to receive 41-1/2 shares
in the expectation that thereby each family would own
one-half of the stock of the corporation.

The trier of

fact could have inferred, and did, that the parties were
speaking without regard to exactitude but were satisfied
with approximate equality.

Such a record does not reflect

the clear, definite and convincing evidence required.
Moreover,

it is, as a matter of law, giving Appellants the

benefit of all inferences, not such evidence as shows
mutual mistakes justifying reformation.
The trial court correctly ruled that Appellants'
counterclaim for reformation be dismissed with prejudice.
This Court should affirm.
IV.

THE EXCLUDED EVIDENCE WAS CORRECTLY EXCLUDED.

During the trial the court excluded certain
documents, of which Appellants now complain.
App. 's Br. 6; Ex. 20, App. 's Br. 11).

(Ex. 15,

Those documents do

not tend to establish any of the elements of a cause of
action for reformation.

Individually, or in the

aggregate, they either tend to show a careless use of
language, the propensity of us all to speak in
approximations, or a belief that a different result would
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be or was achieved by dividing Savage's stock 41-1/2
shares to each family.

Their exclusion was thus not

prej ud ic ial.
V.

APPELLANTS' ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT MERELY RAISES
ISSUES OF CREDIBILITY WHICH WERE RESOLVED
AGAINST APPELLANTS BELOW.

In Point II of their brief, Appellants assert that the
trial court should have found an estoppel that barred
plaintiffs' claim.

This argument merely raises questions

of credibility, especially the credibility of Schneiter,
Jr.

For instance on pp. 16 and 17 of their brief,

Appellants cite as record support for their assertions the
testimony of Schneiter, Jr.

Obviously, the trial court

chose not to believe this testimony.

Some of it is

inherently incredible, such as the testimony by Schneiter
that Mr. Cosgriff intended to give his valuable investment
to the Schneiters.

(R. 167, 169, 197).

As Appellants

concede much of it is disputed by the testimony of other
witnesses.

(App. 's Br. at 17, fn.

8.

for additional rebuttal testimony.)

See also R. 238-240
The essential element

of Appellants' estoppel argument is that the Respondents
long acquiesced in Appellants' claim to equal ownership.
However, there is ample testimony that only in 1975 did
the Cosgriff interests learn that the Schneiters asserted
equal ownership, knowledge which quickly precipitated this
suit.

(R.

111-112, 121-122, 127, 130-131) .
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Not only is the testimony of Schneiter disputed
but Schneiter was shown to be unreliable.

He obliterated

the stock record book so as to cast confusion about the
number of shares owned by him.

He improperly changed the

financial records so as to reflect an additional share of
stock in his name.
It is, therefore, not surprising or inappropriate
that the trier of the facts, who had a chance to observe
Schneiter, Jr. on the stand, chose to disbelieve him.
Issues of credibility are appropriately lodged with the
trier of facts, not an appellate court.

Filmore City v.

Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 1318 {Utah 1977).
Schneiter's testimony as to reliance is equally
suspect.

He conceded that his involvement with Lake Hills

afforded him,

in addition to the cash salary and 50 lots

concededly paid him, numerous opportunities for profit,
such as operation of a golfing-goods store on the
premises, a driving range concession on the premises, and
golf cart rental on the premises {R. 201-206)

.2/

He

also had the opportunity to oversee his family investment
and thereby make himself a rich man through the
appreciation of his stock.

~/

He also testified he was actively pursuing other
business enterprises in Utah during the period {R.
199) .
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Appellants' evidence of estoppel is not only
disputed by other more credible witnesses but it also is
internally inconsistent in that there existed ample
reasons for him to devote his time to Lake Hills even as a
minority shareholder.

Appellants have failed to carry

this defense by a prepondurance of the evidence.
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the judgment.
CONCLUSION
As stated earlier, this appeal presents this Court
with an example of the salutory purposes of the
requirement for clear, definite and convincing evidence in
a suit for reformation.

Appellants seek to reform a

contract over 20 years old when all the principal actors
are long dead, relying solely upon ambiguous evidence
susceptible to two rational inferences.

It is precisely

this type of evidence that the rule is designed to
defeat.

Accordingly, the Court should affirm the judgment

below in all respect.
Respectfully submitted,

FABIAN & CLENDENIN

Warren Patten
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondents
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